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Economy and Democracy: a review
The basis for this paper is a course of lectures named “Economy and Democracy”, 
held in Dubrovnik (Croatia) from 20th to 27th September 2008. I was fortunate enough 
to have participated in this course as a member of the Zagreb Law Faculty group. Also 
present were the Central European University postgraduate students which came from 
all over the world (Russia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Serbia, Nigeria…). Attending pro-
fessors were: Professor Ivan Šimonović, Professor Tibor Várady, Professor Stefan Mes-
smann and Professor Tibor Tajti. During this course a wide variety of legal themes were 
discussed and thoroughly worked out, namely the ﬁ elds of international business law, 
civil law, constitutional law and family were addressed.
I would like to take this opportunity to analyse the questions of family law. Professor 
Tibor Várady delivered several lectures concerning the Soviet Legal Innovation and the 
Law of the Western World, in which numerous interesting issues were analysed and di-
scussed. The lecture was based on John Quigley’s book1of the same title.
Ad 1. DOMESTIC RELATIONS REGULATION IN THE WESTERN WORLD (beginning 
of the 20th century)
While reading this book and preparing for the lecture, I was surprised by the level of 
inequality between genders both in Russia and in countries of the Western World at the 
beginning of the 20th century. I knew that at that time family relations were patriarchal 
in structure and that the husband was the undisputed head of the family. Still, I did not 
expect the position of the wife to be so unfavourable , i.e. that her rights were almost 
non-existing.
For example, English common law allowed the husband to beat his wife. This was his 
right of chastisement over the wife.2  Furthermore, it also prescribed that the husband 
was the legal representative of his wife.3 Indeed, this meant that a married woman could 
not represent herself in any legal proceedings.
The German Civil Code gave the husband the right to decide about all matters of 
matrimonial life.4 In fact, this meant that the husband was the bearer of all important 
family decisions, including choosing the place of residence. Furthermore, it gave the 
husband the right to manage his wife’s property and to give his wife’s employer notice of 
termination of employment.5 Provisions of this kind are unimaginable in today’s legisla-
1 J. QUIEGLY, Soviet Legal Innovation and the Law of the Western World, Cambridge University press, 2007. 
2 Ibid, str. 17.
3 Ibid, str. 18.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
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tion because women have every right to manage their property, not to mention to make 
employment decisions for themselves.
Furthermore, it was widely accepted in Europe that if a woman is to marry a man 
of different citizenship, her citizenship is to be automatically changed to that of her hu-
sband, example of which is Norway’s marriage law of 1918.6 
In the beginning of the 20th century the matter of divorce drew a lot of attention. In 
Europe divorce was severely restricted. Furthermore, it was typically less accessible to 
women than for men. The rule was that a spouse had to prove a breach of the marriage 
contract in order to obtain a divorce (example: in France divorce was available only in 
cases of adultery, condemnation to infamous punishment, or grave violation of marital 
duties).7
Ad 2. RUSSIAN LAW ON THE FAMILY UNDER THE TSARS (until 1917) 
Russia under the tsars, i.e. until 1917, was enforcing similar principles of family law 
as countries of the Western World, meaning that women in Russia were also unequal to 
men. For example, a wife was obliged to obey her husband as head of the family and 
to reside at a location selected by the man.8 From this one could conclude that, like in 
Germany or England, the husband made all decisions concerning the family (wife and the 
children). Furthermore, husband had legal power over his wife, meaning he was her legal 
representative and could, for example, prohibit her from taking a job outside the home.
In addition, if a Russian woman married a foreigner she would have lost her Russian 
citizenship.9 Concerning marriage and divorce, it is important to emphasise that they 
were not handled by government courts, but through ecclesiastical rules and institutions. 
Divorce was not available to Roman Catholics. On the other hand, for Russian Orthodox, 
divorce was possible only upon proof of speciﬁ c grounds.10
Ad 3. SOVIET LEGAL INNOVATION IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW (1917, 1918 
and 1926)
After gaining power, Lenin and the Bolshevik party declared the tsar’s legislation void. 
In its place they wanted to install new enactments, grounded on legal concepts that 
would challenge the foundations of Western society.
This legal revolution began in 1917 with the adoption of two separate decrees on mar-
riage and divorce. One year later, in 1918, a full Code on family law was enacted. This fa-
mily law was based on assumptions of equality between women and men, giving women 
equal rights in all matters relating to marriage.11 Many of the ideas contained in the above 
law posed a challenge to the traditional family and to property rights. Nevertheless, the 
West absorbed many of the ideas it originally found threatening.
6 Ibid, str. 19.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid, str. 20.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid, str. 19.
11 Ibid, str. 20.
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The 1918 Soviet family code
1. MARRIAGE:
Marriage could be contracted only with the consent of both spouses.12
2. DIVORCE
Divorce was to be granted at the request of either party, without any proof of groun-
ds. If both spouses sought a divorce, they could, instead of going before a judge, simply 
register their divorce at the civil registry, which was considered as a signiﬁ cant challenge 
to the traditional family.13
3. PROPERTY RIGHTS:
Marriage does not create commonality of the property of the spouses, meaning the 
wife controlled her own property.14 The idea was to reduce economic consequences of 
marriage and to create ﬁ nancial autonomy between the spouses, which was considered 
as a signiﬁ cant challenge to property rights.
4. ALIMONY:
No provision on alimony was made in the 1918 Code. Non-existence of provision 
concerning alimony was, in my opinion, confusing. What was the reason for this legal va-
cuum? My presumption is that the Bolshevik government wanted to realize the principle 
of equality to the full extent, meaning there was no need for spousal support. But even 
if we can agree with such a presumption, and we cannot, there is still the issue of child 
support left unresolved. This problem was solved with the 1926 Soviet family code.
5. DECISIONS CONCERNING THE FAMILY:
The wife was given equal legal authority with the husband in decisions affecting their 
children.15 If one spouse were to change residence, the other was not obliged to follow.16
6. CITIZENSHIP:
Marriage would effect no change in citizenship if the nationality of the spouses differed.17
As we can see, the 1918 Soviet family code brought lots of innovation in the dome-
stic relations realm and those innovations broke with tradition, but this was not the main 
problem. The main problem was that this code was too advanced to be practical. It was 
just too far ahead of its time. There was a huge gap between the existing conditions of 
the Soviet society and the principles enforced by this code. For example, the 1918 family 
code separated property of the spouses. This provision actually disadvantaged women 
upon divorce because in the 1920s unemployment was high and women could not ﬁ nd 
work in an economy in which men were the main breadwinners.18 The Soviet economy 
lagged behind with respect to  the law. This conclusion leads us to two very important 
questions. First, is it good or beneﬁ cial to enact laws ahead of their time? Second, will 
advanced laws stimulate development of  society or should it be the other way around?  
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.




18 Ibid, str. 24.
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The 1926 Soviet family code     
The new Code was less radical than the previous one. It deemed property earned 
by the spouses during the marriage as community property.19 By doing so, the legislator 
wanted to protect the ﬁ nancial interests of women because they had not reached the ear-
ning capacity of men and therefore the social base for ﬁ nancial autonomy did not exist.20 
In that manner, the legislator also wanted to ensure proper care of the children. The 1926 
Family code recognized the de facto, or common law, marriage. It said that informal mar-
riages were the equivalent of registered marriages for purposes of property rights.21 This 
code also provided for the possibility of alimony. Alimony could be ordered only if one 
of the spouses was unable to work, or, though able to work, was unemployed. Alimony 
could be collected only for one year after the marriage ended.22 This provision on alimony 
is also not the most effective one because it prescribes ﬁ nancial support of the spouse for 
only one year after the marriage ended and there are no exceptions made. What happens 
if, in that time, the supported spouse really could not ﬁ nd a job or had an accident and 
became handicapped for life? According to the 1926 Family code, that spouse did not 
have legal grounds to seek alimony if the one year term had expired.
It is obvious that the 1926 Family code amended some of the earlier over-revolu-
tionary principles. It took a few steps backwards and, by doing so, reduced the lack of 
balance between the advanced law and the not-so-advanced society. In that manner, it 
made its provisions realizable and more effective. This also demonstrates that no matter 
how good or advanced laws are, they have to have a connection with reality/the actual 
society. Otherwise, they could produce unwanted consequences.
CONCLUSION
During the discussion on John Quigley’s book, several important questions were rai-
sed.. I have already mentioned the ﬁ rst two questions. First, is it good or beneﬁ cial to 
enact laws ahead of their time? Second, will advanced laws stimulate development of 
society or should it be the other way round? Third, and for me the most interesting one, 
did Soviet legal innovation in the Family Law jurisdiction inﬂ uence countries of the We-
stern World or did they have a parallel and separate process of development? There is 
no universal or ﬁ nal answer to these questions. Possible answers can help us in better 
understanding the development of domestic relations law in two completely opposite 
sides of the world: in countries of the Western World and the Soviet Union.
Be as it may, the Dubrovnik Course/Seminar was deﬁ nitely a great occasion for im-
proving legal knowledge and discussion skills. It was also a great opportunity to meet 
interesting people, students and professors, from all over the world and to get an insight 
into their legal standings and opinions, especially concerning family law-related issues 
(as well as many other interesting law-related topics). For me this Seminar/Course re-
presents the beginning of further international training? of postgraduate students of law. 
For this reason, I hope that the tradition of holding this very important Course/Seminar 





22 Ibid, str. 25.
